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1. The facts are taken from an actual case; the participants’ names, however, have
been changed.
Is the Wheel Unbalanced? A Study




IN JULY 2001, CARL AND MARY KAUFMAN1 learned that a developer
planned to convert the farmland behind their house into a golf course.
The Kaufmans received a notice from the city proposing to rezone the
parcel from A-2, Agricultural, to R-5, Planned Unit Development
(PUD). The PUD plan included a fairway bordering the Kaufmans’
backyard and a row of townhouses on the other side. Because the Kauf-
mans treasured their privacy, this was a significant blow, especially
since the same developer, who had sold them their house just two years
before, had assured them that the land directly behind their house was
not suitable for development and that the remainder would most likely
be developed as single-family residential.
The biggest issue for the Kaufmans, however, was the development’s
potential impact on a creek that ran through the developer’s property,
meandering just yards from the boundary of the Kaufmans’ back lot.
Bordered by mature trees and bushes, the creek area was full of wildlife
and provided a scenic border for the Kaufmans’ land. The golf course
developer, however, planned to cut down all of the trees and “straighten”
the creek, basically turning it into a drainage ditch, which would allow
the golf course to make maximum use of the remaining land.
The proposed rezoning of the property first required review by the
local Planning and Zoning Commission so the Kaufmans gathered their
neighbors and assembled their arguments against the proposal. At the
least, they argued, the city should require the developer to leave the
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creek and trees intact as a buffer. Their plea, however, fell on deaf ears.
The Planning and Zoning Commission, made up of ten members, in-
cluded many individuals who had an interest in the project, including
an employee of the project developer, a real estate agent who had the
listing for the development’s residential area, a member of the country
club whose golf course was part of the project, a local banker (also a
country club member) who hoped to get some of the mortgage business,
and the owner of the company who would be laying the sod for the
golf course. Of these, only the real estate agent recused herself from
voting on the matter. Not surprisingly, the commission recommended
the project unanimously. In addition, the commission categorically re-
fused to restrict the developer’s ability to move the creek and cut down
the trees; in fact, the commission imposed no conditions on approval.
While the Kaufmans’ case may sound like an extreme case of the
fox guarding the henhouse, there is a widespread perception that zoning
boards are often biased.2 The allegations of bias may be broken down
into two types. First, there are conflicts of interest, in which a member
of the zoning board will benefit directly from the decision or has an
interest in or a relationship with one of the parties. Second, there is
more systemic or institutional bias—that is, the perception that zoning
boards are filled with individuals who have a built-in predilection in
favor of development projects. Conversely, “normal citizens,” who
might be more sympathetic to the complaints of the neighbors impacted
by development, are left off of these boards in favor of business or
professional types who benefit, either directly or indirectly, from de-
velopment projects. Certain professions seem to invariably cause sus-
picion, including “architects, attorneys, developers, engineers, finan-
ciers (e.g., banking and mortgage lenders), realtors, and surveyors.”3
Zoning decisions typically involve large stakes—a lot of money for
developers on one side and vital health, safety, and welfare concerns
of neighboring residents on the other.4 At the same time, the city itself
has important interests in economic development and overall city plan-
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ning. In this atmosphere, all local citizens will likely have some interest
in the outcome, an interest that may be inevitable and perhaps even
desirable. Nevertheless, at some point a generalized interest in the city’s
development becomes an undesirable bias, a predilection in favor of
one side or the other.
Yet, impartial decision makers are a crucial component of the zoning
process, not only to avoid unfairness in an individual case, but also to
preserve the appearance of impartiality necessary for the legitimacy of
the system.5 As Professor Cordes noted, “the growing ‘dealmaking’
perception of zoning practice, in which zoning decisions are often made
in a very particularized and seemingly ad hoc manner, raises legitimacy
concerns exacerbated by partial decisionmakers.”6 The existence of sys-
temic bias may, and indeed should, reduce the degree of deference
afforded to the decisions of these boards by appellate bodies, including
city councils and courts.
States and cities have made little attempt to limit bias on zoning
boards. Some state laws restrict the makeup of the boards, but the lim-
itations are extremely narrow.7 Another approach is to enact a conflict of
interest provision, which requires board members to refrain from par-
ticipating in matters in which they have a direct or an indirect interest.
While state laws regulating zoning board conflicts are rare, some cities
have adopted such rules, of varying effectiveness. The vast majority of
cities, however, operate without any explicit conflict regulations.
We wondered whether the lack of control over the make-up of zoning
boards resulted in a bias in favor of development interests. Although
there are indications that ethics allegations against zoning board mem-
bers are increasing,8 there is a paucity of data on the overall composition
of zoning boards. Therefore, we conducted a survey to determine
whether Iowa zoning boards fairly represent a cross-section of the com-
munity. We also attempted to determine whether, based on the occu-
pations of zoning board members, one could discern a systemic slant
toward development interests. We conclude that representational cross-
sections vary widely by the size of the community. While small towns
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have a fairly representative board makeup, blue-collar citizens are dra-
matically underrepresented in larger cities. In addition, although much
depends on interpretation, we conclude that the majority of those sitting
on zoning boards stand to benefit, either directly or indirectly, from
development.
This article will first examine the legal controls on zoning board bias,
including state statutes, local ordinances, and case law. We will then
discuss the results of our survey of Iowa zoning board bias and compare
the data to a similar occupational study from 1937. Finally, we will
conclude with possible solutions to the potential direct and indirect bias
problems we identify. In the end, we conclude that city councils should
more carefully consider the occupational makeup of zoning boards in
making appointments. We recommend, in fact, that state legislatures
take a more active role in ensuring a broader representation. Finally,
we believe that cities should adopt a clear rule regarding conflicts of
interest to ensure that most forms of direct bias are eliminated.
This article will use the term “zoning board” to mean either a board
of zoning adjustment or a planning and zoning commission. Those two
bodies, of course, have quite different powers and duties. The Board
of Zoning Adjustment (BZA), sometimes called a Board of Zoning
Appeals, may grant relief from the zoning laws, through the use of a
variance, special exception, or special use permit. It may also reverse
particular zoning determinations made by the zoning officer.9 The Plan-
ning and Zoning Commission (P&Z), on the other hand, is responsible
for developing the comprehensive plan for the city. In addition, the
Commission initially recommends the particular zoning classifications
for adoption by the city council; thereafter, any amendments to the
zoning regulations or zoning map go through the Commission for its
recommendation before final action by the council.10 Both of these
boards, however, are appointed by the city council or mayor and both
face similar perceptions of bias in favor of development interests.
II. Legal Controls Regarding Bias
The legal system has responded to the potential of zoning board bias
in very limited ways. First, states have enacted general statutes relating
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to conflicts of interest, most commonly referring to public officials in
general, and more rarely, regarding zoning officials in particular. While
these statutes provide some guidance, they are generally too vague or
too limited to reach most instances of direct bias, let alone the overall
issue of institutional bias. Some municipalities have adopted their own
conflict ordinances, but the majority of states have not. Moreover, most
of the conflict ordinances reach only the most egregious conflicts. Fi-
nally, boards may look to court decisions that have interpreted the stat-
utes and ordinances, or that have adopted common law conflict limi-
tations. However, the decisions focus solely on direct conflicts, rather
than institutional bias, and grant relief in only the most blatant cases
of bias.11 The cases do not provide a coherent guide for a zoning board
member wishing to avoid impropriety.
This section examines these attempts to control zoning board bias
and the limitations of each approach.12 We use Iowa law as our primary
example in order to illustrate the impact—or lack thereof—that the
state’s legal controls have had on the composition of zoning boards.
A. Statutes and Ordinances
Legislative controls on zoning board bias take the form of state statutes
or local ordinances. While general statutes on direct conflicts of interest
are common, there are few statutes relating specifically to zoning
boards, and the statutes are typically too generalized to be of great use.
Some municipalities have ordinances relating to conflicts of interest,
but many do not. Finally, legislative attempts to attack institutional bias
are almost nonexistent.
Although a few states have specific conflict of interest provisions
regulating zoning board members, most have only an ethics provision
regulating public officials in general.13 Most of these conflict of interest
statutes “reflect the common-law principle that public officials should
not participate in decisions in which they have a personal interest.”14
State statutes prohibiting conflicts of interest typically fail to delineate
what interests are disqualifying. For example, a statute may simply
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require disqualification when an official has a personal or financial in-
terest, but provide no definition of these interests.15 While there are
some clear cases of direct financial interest, such as a developer whose
project is before the board, the statutes do not specify whether a more
remote interest—such as a real estate agent who hopes to sell lots in
the new development—would also be disqualifying. Disqualification
for “personal interest” is even harder to interpret. Perhaps being the
brother-in-law of the developer would be a clear case, but what if you
are a member of the country club that is making the application for
rezoning?
Iowa, for example, has a general conflicts of interest statute for all
public employees and for those who “serve” the state or its subdivi-
sions.16 The statute, however, does not define what interests present a
conflict. The statute indicates only that the official must disclose the
existence of a conflict and refrain from taking action—including voting
or influencing the vote—that would create a benefit for the outside
interest.17 Under Iowa law, even if the conflicted official votes, the
conflict will not void a city’s action, unless that official’s vote was
crucial to the passage of the measure.18 Thus, even if a conflict is
proven, it will be difficult to actually overturn a board’s decision.
Iowa municipalities, by and large, have not clarified the situation by
adopting more specific local ordinances. Our survey revealed that the
majority of Iowa cities have no conflicts rule.19 Those that do have a
written rule use general terms to describe the disqualifying interests,
such as a personal, financial, or familial relationship. Some cities in-
dicated that they use, as a guide, another Iowa statute, which prohibits
public officials from acquiring personal interests in urban renewal pro-
jects.20 That statute sets out more specifically what constitutes a dis-
qualifying interest: for example, ownership of 5 percent or less of a
corporation’s stock is not deemed “ownership” for purposes of deter-
mining a financial interest.21
Note that all of these provisions deal with “direct” conflicts of in-
terest, in which the individual is directly involved with the project at
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issue. Institutional bias, or the overall composition of local zoning
boards, is not addressed. Iowa has one statute that addresses institu-
tional bias by providing a minimal control on the composition of boards
of adjustment: “A majority of the members of the board of adjustment
shall be persons representing the public at large and shall not be in-
volved in the business of purchasing or selling real estate.”22 The Iowa
Attorney General has interpreted the latter category broadly—to refer
not only to realtors, but also to employees of companies that buy and
sell real estate, if that employee is actively engaged in that part of the
business or is generally in a position of influence in the business.23
However, the Attorney General does not interpret the admonition that
the majority of members must represent “the public at large” as re-
quiring any kind of affirmative attempt to appoint a cross-section of
occupations to the board. Rather, the Attorney General believes that
phrase simply reinforces the limitation on those in the real estate busi-
ness.24
This attempt to control who is appointed to zoning boards is rare.
Some states restrict board appointment to residents25 and a few require
some kind of geographic distribution of board members.26 States some-
times prohibit city officials or city employees from membership on the
boards, or at least limit their number.27 Further, Tennessee explicitly
requires a degree of diversity on these boards. BZA members in those
Tennessee counties having a metropolitan government are supposed to
include at least two female members, as well as two from historically
underrepresented racial groups.28 Likewise, city planning commissions
are to proportionally reflect the racial make-up of the municipality.29
Very few states, however, have any occupational restriction on board
membership similar to Iowa’s real estate limitation. Michigan has a
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vague and presumably unenforceable requirement that planning com-
missions should “represent insofar as is possible different professions
and occupations.”30 Minnesota prohibits land developers from mem-
bership on county planning commissions.31 Oregon has the most far-
reaching restriction: no more than two members of a P&Z commission
may “engage principally in the buying, selling or developing of real
estate for profit.”32 In addition, no more than two members may be
engaged in the same kind of occupation.33 As our survey shows, a law
at least as strong as Oregon’s may be necessary to achieve the kind of
occupational diversity we presumably desire on these boards.
B. Case Law
With little statutory guidance as to what constitutes a conflict of interest
on zoning boards, court decisions may help to flesh out the limits of
permissible interests. Although fact patterns are diverse, courts clearly
look for a strong financial or other personal advantage in the outcome
of the matter. There are no common law restrictions regarding institu-
tional bias, and even direct bias tests reach only the most egregious
cases of conflict of interest. An early Iowa case described the prohi-
bition on self-interest in vivid prose:
He was called upon to serve two masters; one with which his interest financially was
bound up, the other, in which was involved his public duty as an officer of the city.
He was bound, therefore, to serve both faithfully—the bank of which he was an
officer and in which he was financially interested, and the city of which he was also
an officer and servant. It is an old saying that a man cannot serve two masters. . . .
A temptation would be offered . . . to disregard his public duty, and yield to the
temptation of personal interest. It is this that the law guards against. . . . The law
intends that these public officers should, like Caesar’s wife, be above suspicion and
temptation.34
Despite this general admonition, Iowa courts require a significant
level of personal interest before a conflict of interest will arise. In Bluffs
Development Co., Inc. v. Board of Adjustment of Pottawattamie County,
Iowa,35 for example, an applicant who was denied a conditional use
permit alleged conflicts of interest against four members of the board
of adjustment.36 One board member was employed by an insurance
company which had customers who opposed the permit.37 Another was
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employed by a company whose board of directors included a vocal
opponent of the permit.38 A third board member made a public com-
ment about denying the application before it was even presented to the
board.39 The fourth board member had a son, employed as a mainte-
nance worker for the city, who opposed the permit.40
The court determined that these dealings were too remote to consti-
tute a conflict of interest.41 The court stated that its “conclusion might
. . . have been different if a board member had a direct interest that
would have been substantially enhanced or depreciated depending on
the vote.”42 Because there was no applicable statute on conflicts of
interest in Iowa at the time, the court followed the common-law prin-
ciple, which finds a conflict of interest if officials have “prejudged the
case, [have] a personal or pecuniary interest, where [they are] related
to an interested person . . . or where [they are] biased, prejudiced, or
labor [ ] under a personal ill-will toward a party.”43
Although the court noted that there was “no mathematical way to
quantify the interest necessary” to disqualify zoning board members,
the interest must be “direct, definite, capable of demonstration, not
remote, uncertain, contingent, unsubstantial, or merely speculative or
theoretical.”44 The court explained: “[t]he interest must be different
from that which the quasi-judicial officer holds in common with mem-
bers of the public. For example, a personal interest in the welfare of
the community is not a disqualifying interest.”45 Obviously this would
exclude a claim of indirect occupational or institutional bias.
Other courts have similarly concluded that only direct interests con-
stitute conflicts requiring disqualification. In Blinkoff v. Planning Zon-
ing Commission,46 the challenged commissioner was an electrical con-
tractor and had previously worked on projects with the applicant.47 The
Connecticut court found no impermissible conflict because all previous
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jobs were the result of the contractor being the low bidder, rather than
“a payoff for voting favorably on the application.”48
Even when there is an obvious interest, most courts find no violation
when the member does not vote on the matter.49 In another Connecti-
cut case, a zoning commission member owned a campground adjacent
to a proposed bituminous concrete manufacturing site.50 The member
did not vote on the matter, but she discussed it with the town planner
and town attorney, questioned the legality of the proposal, and par-
ticipated in a zoning commission meeting discussing the matter.51 The
court determined that there could be “no doubt” that the commission
member “had a direct personal, and possibly financial, interest.”52 De-
spite this, the court found no violation because she did not vote, even
though the commissioner’s views influenced the other commission
members.53
Despite the difficulty of proving a conflict, courts have found con-
flicts of interest where zoning board members have a close relationship
with the applicant and would stand to benefit. For example, courts have
found a conflict where the board member was: the applicant’s accoun-
tant and tax advisor;54 an advertising agency executive who would get
the advertising account for the project;55 a lawyer for the applicant in
legal matters ten years earlier;56 a partner of the lawyer representing
the applicants;57 a realtor who shared an office with another realtor who
represented an applicant;58 and an employee at a bank that held an
overdue loan that was part of a petition.59
Business dealings, however, do not always translate into conflicts
of interest. No conflicts were found when: a board member had sold
insurance to a petitioner;60 a board member had previously served as
a real estate broker on the land in issue;61 a board member’s employer
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was represented by the same law firm as the applicant;62 an applicant
was a customer at the bank where the board member was an officer;63
and a board member who owned an implement dealership had previously
sold two tillers and a tractor to the petitioner, and then sold him a new
tractor after the petition was granted.64 Thus, the line seems to be drawn
at a specific, direct interest in the particular project at issue.
A broader test might result in an unacceptable number of conflicts,
especially in smaller towns. It is perhaps inevitable that many people
who are willing to donate time to these civic endeavors also have a
strong interest in how the city develops. Moreover, in smaller towns,
the web of overlapping interests can quickly become all-encompassing.
As the New York Attorney General noted, a board member should not
resign based only on his occupation as an architect whose projects
sometimes come before the board.65 The opinion explains: “[I]f resig-
nation and not recusal was the appropriate remedy in every instance
where a local official’s private endeavors raised a potential conflict of
interest . . . local units of government would have difficulty finding
qualified individuals to serve the public interest.”66
Nevertheless, the strict test for disqualification seems only to have
added to the public’s suspicion of improper zoning decisions. As one
court observed: “The evil lies not in influence improperly exercised but
rather in the creation of a situation tending to weaken public confidence
and to undermine the sense of security of individual rights which the
property owner must feel assured will always exist in the exercise of
zoning power.”67
III. The Existence of Bias
Although anecdotal evidence of zoning board bias abounds, establish-
ing the existence of bias empirically presents a challenge. In any in-
dividual case, proving the particular interests of board members would
be time-consuming and ultimately may not reach every possible con-
nection to the project at issue. Drafting a survey to capture these inter-
ests would be almost impossible.
62. Anderson v. Zoning Comm’n of City of Norwalk, 253 A.2d 16 (Conn. 1968).
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Therefore, we decided to focus primarily on the occupational com-
position of zoning boards. Our premise is that zoning boards should
represent a good cross-section of the community in order to have the
best chance of avoiding biased decisions. We also wanted to determine
whether boards were “stacked” with those who, by occupation, were
inordinately interested in development projects and therefore could be
said to be inherently biased.
We surveyed every city in Iowa with a population over 1,000. We
asked each city questions regarding the occupational composition of its
BZA and of its P&Z. We also asked for information regarding the city’s
conflict of interest rules and for any recent examples of conflicts that
had arisen.
Interestingly, this type of survey has not been done frequently. We
uncovered only one similar survey, conducted by Robert Walker in
1937. We decided to use his survey as our benchmark, of sorts, to
compare whether the occupational composition of zoning boards has
changed much since then. Part of our survey data, therefore, is arranged
to provide an easy comparison with the Walker survey.
A. 1937 Walker Occupational Survey
In 1937, Robert Walker conducted an “Occupational Analysis of
Thirty-One City Planning Commissions,” in conjunction with his book
on the municipal planning function.68 Walker surveyed 208 planning
commission members in thirty-one of the larger cities of the United
States to determine their occupations.69 Walker’s survey came at a time
when city planning was young—only about twenty years after New
York City had enacted the nation’s first comprehensive zoning ordi-
nance and only a decade after the Supreme Court had given its consti-
tutional seal of approval to the idea.70
Even back then Walker was concerned that the boards were not rep-
resentative of the public. He observed that “certain technical and pro-
fessional groups have secured a definite hold upon the planning com-
missions.”71 In fact, 79.4 percent of the membership of the commissions
studied belonged to the technical and professional groups.72
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*Two women were listed under their respective occupations rather than in the ‘‘women’’
category.
Walker explained why white collar groups were disproportionately
represented:
The group classed as general businessmen, although drawn from a variety of occu-
pations, represents preponderantly the executive and owner group. They reflect the
origin of planning as a civic movement and the consequent reliance upon the prestige
of men with status and income to obtain public support. . . . The disproportionate
number of realtors is due primarily to their avowed special interest in zoning and
consequent pressure for representation from local realty boards. The prevalence of
lawyers is due also to zoning, which has provoked numerous legal problems and
turned most commission meetings into courtlike hearings upon applications for zone
changes. The architects and engineers are, of course, indicative of the prevailing
view that planning is chiefly a matter of design and engineering.73
Walker saw several consequences of this occupational distribution.74
First, he was concerned that the large percentage of upper-income busi-
nessmen caused the commissions to be too conservative.75 He observed:
“Their status is frequently such that they dislike public criticism and
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fear loss of prestige through making specific recommendations on con-
troversial issues.”76 Second, he was concerned that the large percentage
of realtors, architects, contractors, and engineers caused the commis-
sions to focus on expansion and new construction, and did not reflect
“the citizen point of view.”77 Lastly, he was concerned that the com-
missions did not represent the population as a whole.78 Much of his
concern focused on the lack of blue-collar representation.79 Walker con-
cluded that “the claim that planning commissions are more objective
than elected officials must be rejected.”80
Walker’s data shows a remarkable concentration of occupations on
zoning commissions. Although he does not break down the class of
“businessmen,” which would have been instructive, he does indicate
that the majority of them were business owners or management rather
than salesmen or clerks.81 His survey is a rare critique of the institu-
tional bias prevalent on zoning commissions in the early days of zoning.
We wondered to what extent the situation had changed.
B. 2003 Iowa Survey
The purpose of our Iowa zoning board study was twofold. First, we
attempted to discern whether the occupational make-up of zoning
boards indicated a bias toward development. This involved an attempt
to replicate the Walker study, to determine whether present-day Iowa
zoning boards represent a good cross-section of the population in terms
of class and occupation. In addition, we tried to identify “pro-
developer” occupations to determine whether boards displayed an in-
stitutional bias in that direction.
Second, we asked specifically whether the municipality had any reg-
ulations dealing with conflicts of interest in zoning board decisions. We
also asked the city to report on whether any such conflicts had arisen
recently. The survey thus attempted to discern whether conflicts of in-
terest were frequently a problem and whether cities were making any
attempt to deal with the issue formally.
We sent the survey to all Iowa cities with populations above 1,000,
on the assumption that towns with lower populations either did not
have zoning or had so few people to serve on boards that the results
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would be atypical. We received a very strong response: out of 274
surveys sent, 177 usable surveys were returned, for a response rate of
65 percent. We then conducted telephone follow-ups to fill in gaps or
clarify confusing responses. We believe that many of the smaller towns
not responding probably did not have a zoning ordinance.
Table 2
Surveys Sent 274
Surveys Returned 177 (65%)
No Boards 9
Municipalities with Boards 168





Unlike Walker’s survey, our data is weighted toward smaller towns—
66 percent of those responding had populations under 5,000 and 83
percent under 10,000. In contrast, Walker focused solely on large cities,
possibly because zoning and planning were not yet prevalent in smaller
municipalities at the time. In any event, the size of the city does affect
the results, as discussed below.
Our data included a group of retired citizens that was larger than we
anticipated, perhaps because retired people are willing and able to take
on time-consuming public service positions. We debated whether to
include them in our occupational survey. One could argue that once an
individual is retired, the bias associated with his or her former position
has been neutralized. If they are no longer in the construction business,
for example, then they will not be influenced by the impact of a par-
ticular project on the industry. However, one could also argue, for three
reasons, the bias remains. First, a lifetime spent in land development
work surely influences the way someone thinks about these projects
and that mode of thinking does not suddenly change at the retirement
party. Second, it is possible that even retired persons retain their con-
nections with others in the land development field, so that when they
see a former colleague on the other side of the table, they are more
likely to be sympathetic to that position. Finally, a retired plumber or
contractor may still own part of the business and may still get some
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benefit from continued growth. Therefore, we concluded that retired
people are probably influenced, but perhaps less so than those actively
engaged in the occupation. Thus, our tables of data include the numbers
both with and without retired citizens.
A small number of board positions were vacant (less than 1 percent for
BZA; less than 2 percent for P&Z). In addition, city officials listed “un-
known” for a fair number of board members’ occupations (12 percent for
BZA; about 9 percent for P&Z). A few individuals were listed simply as
“on disability,” without an indication of what their usual occupationswere.
We excluded all of these groups from our calculation of percentages.
1. OCCUPATIONS OF ZONING BOARD MEMBERS: WHITE-COLLAR BIAS
We first attempted to replicate the Walker survey, in order to determine
whether boards continued to be skewed toward upper-income business
owners, professionals, and executives, who Walker thought had a bias
in favor of development. Table 3 shows the occupational classifications
of those serving on city Boards of Zoning Adjustment. Table 4 is the
same information, but excludes those who indicated they were retired.
Tables 5 and 6 indicate the occupations of Planning and Zoning Com-
mission members.
There is some discretion in deciding how to classify various occu-
pations. We used the U.S. Department of Labor classification system.82
While this does not match Walker’s classification scheme exactly, it is
fairly similar.
Table 3: Occupations of BZA Members











and Managerial 53.99 40.98 57.69 63.97 69.84 74.29
Clerical and Sales 17.36 21.71 10.0 20.59 7.94 12.86
Service 6.61 8.26 8.46 2.94 6.35 2.86
Agricultural 3.99 3.98 6.15 4.41 3.17 0
Processing, Trades, and
Labor 17.00 25.08 17.69 8.09 12.70 10.0
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Table 4: Occupations of BZA Members











and Managerial 55.45 41.39 59.62 66.67 69.81 76.92
Clerical and Sales 17.66 23.08 10.58 18.92 7.55 12.31
Service 7.43 9.52 8.65 3.60 7.55 3.08
Agricultural 2.48 1.47 4.81 3.60 3.77 0
Processing, Trades, and
Labor 18.04 24.54 16.35 7.21 11.32 7.69
Table 5: Occupations of P&Z Members











and Managerial 61.47 49.87 64.74 63.78 74.74 80.83
Clerical and Sales 15.70 16.62 13.87 21.94 12.63 7.50
Service 6.42 8.06 5.20 5.61 6.32 4.17
Agricultural 3.47 4.28 4.05 4.08 1.05 0.83
Processing, Trades, and
Labor 12.95 21.59 12.14 4.59 5.26 6.67
Table 6: Occupations of P&Z Members











and Managerial 61.80 48.49 66.90 65.88 72.94 79.82
Clerical and Sales 15.66 16.57 14.08 21.18 14.12 7.89
Service 6.64 9.04 4.23 5.29 7.06 4.39
Agricultural 3.08 3.92 3.52 3.53 1.18 0.88
Processing, Trades, and
Labor 12.81 21.99 11.27 4.12 4.71 7.02
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Using these tables, we can compare the general occupational make-
up of Iowa zoning boards today with the occupational distribution re-
ported by Walker in 1937. Walker reported that zoning boards then
were dominated by business owners, professionals, and technical oc-
cupations; he found that almost 85 percent of board members came
from these groups. Our survey found that there is a much better distri-
bution now across occupations, at least in smaller towns.
Laborers, for example, comprised less than 2 percent of the board
members in Walker’s survey, while laborers make up 17 percent of the
BZA members and 13 percent of the P&Z members in our survey.
Overall, Walker found that 85 percent of board members came from
the professional, technical and managerial class, while we found that
only 54 percent of BZA members and 55 percent of P&Z members
were in that group. Nevertheless, the “white collar” group is still
overrepresented on zoning boards. Although professional/technical/
managerial occupations are the largest group in the general population,
they still make up only 33.6 percent of occupations nationwide and
31.3 percent in Iowa.83 Thus, this “white-collar” group’s share of mem-
bership on zoning boards is approximately 74 percent higher than the
group’s representation in the population.
Moreover, the tilt toward white-collar occupations is more pro-
nounced in larger cities than smaller ones. While the professional/
technical/managerial group makes up only 41 percent of board mem-
bers in the smallest towns, that number climbs steadily until it reaches
about 75 percent in cities over 25,000. This progression probably stems
from greater populations of white-collar workers in larger cities, as well
as the almost total absence of agricultural workers. Because the Walker
survey focused solely on large cities, our data actually illustrates that
the occupational distribution has not changed dramatically from 1937.
In Planning and Zoning Commissions in cities over 25,000, for ex-
ample, our survey showed that 80 percent of the members are still
drawn from the professional, technical, and managerial professions.
Thus, while we can conclude that zoning boards in very small towns
are fairly representative of a cross-section of society, there is still a
pronounced bias toward the professional/technical/managerial class in
our cities. This may be due, at least in part, to the greater willingness
of that class to serve on public bodies—they may be used to speaking
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in public and more comfortable making publicly scrutinized decisions,
for example, than those in the labor or clerical categories. They may
have more connections with city officials and therefore be more likely
to come to mind when appointments are made. The overrepresentation
of the professional class on these boards is no different, after all, than
their overrepresentation in state legislatures or in the U.S. Congress.
Although a general goal of cross-sectional representation is desir-
able, one may question whether the broad classifications drawn by
Walker really say much about possible zoning board bias. There are
bank presidents, for example, who lead the conservation movement
in Iowa. There are attorneys who represent the Sierra Club. And con-
versely, there are factory workers who are fiercely pro-development.
Therefore, we attempt, in the second part of the survey, to reach be-
yond general occupational classifications to identify potential pro-
development bias.
2. OCCUPATIONS OF ZONING BOARD MEMBERS: INSTITUTIONAL
PRO-DEVELOPMENT BIAS
We next attempted to quantify board members whose occupations may
have a “pro-development” influence on their zoning decisions. For ex-
ample, realtors could be naturally predisposed to favor development
projects, not only because they may directly benefit by selling some of
the property, but also because they want to remain on good terms with
developers. Lenders will favor development to generate more loans and
will also want to maintain favorable relations with development inter-
ests. In addition, numerous construction-related occupations can be
safely said to favor development.
Nevertheless, deciding which occupations to identify as “pro-
development” turned out to be a thorny task, and certainly many of the
occupations are difficult to classify. Some occupations are closely as-
sociated with development projects, of course. Developers, realtors,
architects, construction company employees, abstractors, appraisers,
contractors, engineers, electricians, and plumbers are all likely to see a
direct impact on their occupational livelihoods from increased devel-
opment. Attorneys in Iowa do title opinions, and in small towns this is
often a large part of their income. In addition, attorneys feel pressure
to stay on good terms with developers and related entities who may be
potential clients. In Tables 7 and 8, we call these occupations “direct
influence” positions, i.e., jobs that are likely to be directly impacted by
zoning decisions.
Other occupations are likely to be indirectly impacted by increased
development. For example, retail store owners would naturally be pro-
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growth, tending to believe that greater populations would benefit their
businesses. Certain professionals like accountants and insurance agents
might feel the same. The inclusion of these individuals could be criti-
cized, in that arguably almost everyone eventually will indirectly ben-
efit from a city’s economic growth. However, it is easier to imagine a
hardware store owner or an owner of a concrete plant being predisposed
toward development than an elementary schoolteacher, a farmer, or a
factory worker.
Nevertheless, subjective judgment inevitably enters into the classi-
fication of these occupations, particularly at the margins. Undoubtedly
others who listed seemingly unbiased occupations, such as “home-
maker” or “unemployed,” actually have deep biases because they are
married to a developer, for example, or one of their children is involved
in the building industry. Or, in the opposite direction, an architect may
do only commercial projects in a nearby big city and have no bias at
all with respect to local residential developments. Although one might
be able to identify those nuances in an individual case, they are im-
possible to discern in a survey such as this.
With those caveats, Tables 7 and 8 illustrate that a significant per-
centage of zoning board members arguably have an occupational bias
in favor of development.84 However, direct influence positions account
for only about 30 percent of P&Z members. Even adding in those who
may be indirectly biased in favor of development brings the total up to
only about half. BZA members exhibit even less influence. About 54
percent of BZA members had no identifiable occupational bias, about
30 percent had direct-influence occupations, and 16 percent had indirect
occupational bias.
On the one hand, one could suggest that having around half of board
members with a direct or indirect bias toward development hardly
constitutes a balanced wheel. Why wouldn’t we strive for having all
board members unbiased? Certainly the degree of pro-development
bias identified counts as a heavy thumb on the scale of these land use
decisions. On the other hand, those citizens who hold development-
related jobs are entitled to representation on the boards just like any-
one else. Although certain pro-development professions continue to
be disproportionately represented, it may be difficult to achieve much
more balance.
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NO BIAS Clerical, factory workers,teachers
50%
w/o retired: 48%














NO BIAS Clerical, factory workers,teachers
54%
w/o retired: 51%
Thus, we conclude that, while some individual boards may be tilted
toward development interests, overall the data suggests that there is
only partial bias in that direction. While our survey found, for the P&Z
group, 42 contractors out of 1,033 occupations listed, we also found
73 teachers. While there were some attorneys (20), architects (11), and
abstractors (5), there were many more secretaries (40), and salespeople
(50). For the BZA group, out of 764 listed occupations, there were
more teachers (51), secretaries (40) and salespeople (51) than attorneys
(20) or architects (3). There were 44 contractors, which, though sig-
nificant, is only about 6 percent of the total.
Realtors were tremendously over-represented in Walker’s 1937 sur-
vey, taking up over 15 percent of zoning board slots. Because of their
obvious self-interest in promoting development projects and retaining
influence with developers, this degree of representation indicated undue
influence. While realtors still make up a significant group, their rep-
resentation has dwindled dramatically. Our survey found only 49 real-
tors out of 1,033 P&Z members, comprising only 5 percent, and 27
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realtors out of 764 BZA members, about 3.5 percent. Although Iowa
law does limit the appointment of realtors to boards of adjustment, the
law itself does not present much of a barrier, as it would be a rare board
that approaches the statutory threshold.85 Nevertheless, the law’s exis-
tence may make city officials more aware of this potential bias when
they appoint board members.
3. APPOINTMENT RULES SURVEY
Our survey also asked if there were any restrictions regarding who
could be appointed to the zoning boards. Most cities require only that
the member be a resident of the city. In fact, 69 percent of cities re-
sponding have no restrictions other than residency. Approximately 2
percent have only a restatement of the Iowa Code’s limitation on the
appointment of those involved in buying or selling real estate. The other
29 percent have an additional requirement that the member cannot be
a city employee and/or an elected city official.
Bias in the zoning process could be limited by rules that encourage
the appointment of a broader cross-section of the community. A pro-
vision requiring city officials to make appointments based on represen-
tation of the entire community would, of course, be difficult to enforce.
But perhaps broadening the real estate agent rule to include any person
involved in real estate development or construction would result in
more diverse boards. Even if the law itself does not result in too many
changes, it might raise awareness among city officials of the need for
diverse representation.
4. CONFLICT OF INTEREST RULES SURVEY
Our survey asked municipalities for information on any conflict of in-
terest rules that would apply to zoning board members. In addition, we
asked them to describe any conflict of interest situations that had arisen
in the last five years.
Remarkably, 120 municipalities out of 168 responding, or 71 percent,
had no written rule regarding conflicts of interest. Although many of
these are the smaller towns, eight out of fifteen cities with over 25,000
residents had no written conflict rule. Nevertheless, the absence of a writ-
ten rule does not preclude an unwritten policy or practice of abstention
for conflicts. Many municipalities with no written conflicts rule also re-
ported that members had recused themselves in direct interest situations.
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In those municipalities with written rules, the provisions varied
widely. Some rules required disclosure of the conflict, but not neces-
sarily abstention; some allowed participation in discussion, but absten-
tion from voting; some required abstention for “conflicts of interest”
without any definition of what would constitute a conflict. The most
specific conflict provision seemed to be in the City of Eagle Grove,
population 3,712:
It is the policy of the city that no elected or appointed official or city employee, or
the spouse, or minor child of an elected or appointed official or city employee, or a
firm of which the elected or appointed official of the city is a partner or a corporation
of which the elected or appointed official or the city employee holds ten (10) percent
or more of the stocks either directly or indirectly, shall have any personal material
interest or outside affiliation which would likely produce a conflict between their
self-interest and proper performance of the elected or appointed official’s or em-
ployee’s duties. No knowledge gained by any elected or appointed official or em-
ployee in their role as such shall be used in such a manner as to cause a conflict
between their personal interest and the city’s interest. All elected or appointed offi-
cials or employees shall conduct their personal affairs so as to avoid any conduct
that may adversely affect or appear to affect the judgment of the elected or appointed
official or employee.86
The largest city in the survey, Des Moines, with a population around
200,000, had a relatively formal conflict of interest rule:
(a) No member of any administrative or advisory board, committee, commission or
agency shall vote or participate in the discussion before the body or any sub-
committee of the body on any issue in which the member has a direct financial
interest or an interest as defined in sections 2–740 [dealing with city procurement
contracts] and 94–3 [dealing with public improvement contracts] and as de-
scribed in this section. No member of any administrative or advisory board,
committee, commission or agency shall participate in selection or in the award
or administration of a contract if a conflict of interest, real or apparent, would
be involved. Such a conflict would arise when any of the following persons has
a financial or other interest in the firm or contractor selected for award:
(1) The board, committee, commission or agency member;
(2) Any member of his or her immediate family;
(3) His or her partner;
(4) Any organization which employs or is about to employ any of the persons
mentioned in subsections (a)(1) through (3) of this section.
(b) No board, committee, commission or agency member shall solicit or accept
gratuities, favors, money, rebates or anything of monetary value from contrac-
tors, potential contractors or parties to subagreements.
(c) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Code, no two members of any
administrative or advisory board, committee, commission or agency shall be
employees of the same person, firm, company, partnership or other employing
entity. For purposes of this section the owner or proprietor of a firm, company
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or other employing entity and each partner in a partnership and the spouse of
each owner or proprietor or partner shall be considered an employee of the firm,
company, partnership or other employing entity. This subsection shall not dis-
qualify any member of a board, committee, commission or agency serving upon
the effective date of this section.
(d) Any member who violates this section may be subject to disciplinary action by
the appointing authority, including removal from office.
(e) The conflict of interest provisions in sections 2–740 and 94–3 shall also apply
to all members of any administrative or advisory board, committee, commission
or agency.
(f ) Exceptions under federal law. To the extent allowed by applicable federal law
or regulation, the city council may permit exceptions to conflicts of interest under
this section which do not constitute a violation of applicable provisions of state
law. The grant of such exceptions shall be specifically conditioned upon approval
by the appropriate federal agency.87
Despite the length of this rule, it still does not give much guidance on
what constitutes a direct financial or personal interest.
Although most cities have no written rule, the survey revealed a wide
variety of situations in which board members had recused themselves
because of a conflict. In some cases, the disqualifying interest was clear
and direct: the member was asking for the variance, or represented the
applicant as a lawyer or realtor. In other cases, the interest was based
on membership in a group: for example, the board member belonged
to the church requesting a variance, or sat on the board of directors of
the hospital or utility asking for a zoning change. In one case, the
employee of the developer was recused. Other kinds of involvement in
the project resulted in recusals: in three cases, bankers on projects they
were financing; in one, an architect who worked on the project; and in
two cases, contractors who stood to gain from the project. In several
cases, a board member’s family relations caused the recusal. In only
one case did a city report that a recusal was caused because the member
lived near the project site.
IV. Solutions
A. Direct Bias: Adopt Broad Conflict of Interest Rule
Conflict of interest situations identified by cities covered a broad range.
The most common category was “direct involvement in project.” Ex-
amples included the architect who worked on the building for which a
variance was sought, the attorney who represented the applicant for re-
zoning, or the contractor who was hired to construct the building in-
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volved in the site plan approval. Thus, there is no question that a conflict
of interest provision must include abstention for decisions that could
directly affect the financial interests of the board member. These inter-
ests should include family members who stand to benefit from the de-
cision as well. In addition, employees of a company or members of an
organization (such as a church or social group) that is seeking, sup-
porting, or objecting to the board action should recuse themselves.
Another category of conflict problems identified in the survey is the
other side of the coin: neighbors who might be adversely affected by
granting a variance or rezoning. In some instances, for example, board
members lived adjacent to the property in question and therefore would
be directly impacted by the decision. The conflict of interest provision
should provide that property owners or relatives of property owners
directly impacted by the board’s decision should abstain.
We encourage municipalities to avoid any ambiguity about conflicts
of interest by adopting a formal rule setting out the parameters of objec-
tionable conflicting interests. Smaller towns, however, might want a nar-
rower conflict rule. For example, sixty of the eighty-two towns surveyed
with populations under 2,500 indicated they had no written conflict rule.
In a town that size, everyone knows everyone else, and many of the issues
that arise before the board of zoning adjustment will affect board mem-
bers or their relatives at least indirectly. If every possible interest, no
matter how remote, were grounds for recusal, there might be no one left
on the board to make the decisions in many cases. This difficulty was
pointed out by the Connecticut Superior Court: “Local governments,
therefore, would be seriously handicapped if any conceivable interest,
no matter how remote and speculative, would require the disqualification
of a zoning official. Such a policy ‘would not only discourage but might
even prevent capable men and women from serving as members of the
various zoning authorities. . . . ’”88 In smaller towns, therefore, board
members may interpret the conflicts rule more narrowly than members
in larger cities where conflicting interests arise less frequently.
B. Indirect Bias
In larger cities in Iowa, members of white-collar occupations are sig-
nificantly overrepresented on zoning boards. In addition, many occu-
pations with either a direct or indirect bias in favor of development are
overrepresented. Although overall only about half of zoning board
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members have a direct or indirect pro-development interest, there is a
significant potential for any one zoning board to be overpopulated with
pro-development interests.
Because members of pro-development occupations may be the most
interested and available potential board members, the possibility of
institutional bias will persist unless two things happen. First, mayors
and city councils who appoint board members must be aware of the
need to appoint a broad cross-section of the community to zoning
boards. They should be cognizant of the danger of appointing too many
of those who may be directly or indirectly pro-development. As Walker
admonished, the point of view of the “ordinary citizen” should not be
forgotten or overshadowed.
But we may not wish to rely solely on the good intentions of ap-
pointment authorities. They may themselves have a pro-development
bias and, after all, it is a lot more work to convince an “ordinary citizen”
to join the board when you have a ready, willing, and able real estate
agent eager to serve. Therefore, we believe that legislation focusing on
the occupational composition of zoning boards should be enacted. The
statute could, for example, prohibit appointing more than one-third of
a board from those whose occupations are identified as directly pro-
development: not only real estate agents, but also lenders, appraisers,
contractors, construction company employees, and real estate lawyers.
While it is important and valuable to have the expertise and experience
of these persons on the board, there is an unfortunate tendency for those
occupations to be over-represented, thereby unbalancing the wheel in
favor of development interests.
In addition, many municipalities have not adopted conflict of interest
rules to eliminate the more egregious forms of bias. While unwritten
norms may cure many of these problems, cities should adopt clear,
written policies defining when recusal is appropriate, to guide zoning
board members. The policy should be broad enough to encompass in-
direct conflicts as well as direct interests in the outcome.89 In addition,
the municipality should consider a training program for zoning board
members, to advise them on potential conflicts and the need to avoid
impropriety.90
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Unless and until these problems are resolved, courts should be aware
of the potential for bias in zoning board decisions. The deference due
to these bodies should be duly tempered by the knowledge that the
wheel is not always balanced. This awareness should lead to stricter
scrutiny in cases where the board is composed primarily of those who
will benefit, even indirectly, from a development proposal.
C. Independent Decision Makers
As the above discussion reveals, eliminating every interest, direct and
indirect, from a zoning decision may be impossible, especially in
smaller towns. Even developers from other towns sometimes complain
that local developers get breaks that they do not. Given local politics,
perhaps bias is an inevitable part of zoning decisions.
One way to truly eliminate bias would be to take the decision out of
local hands. The farther one gets from the local milieu, the more ob-
jective the decision will be. A regional board or commission could be
appointed, at least for some of the functions most susceptible to bias.
This board could act either as an appellate body, or even as the primary
decision maker, if its jurisdiction were narrow enough to not be over-
worked.
Britain, for example, places much of its authority for planning at the
national level. The central government, for example, determines the
need to plan for additional housing in each district and delineates areas
in which development will be prohibited.91 Primary responsibility for
“planning permission,” which has much in common with our system
of variances or zoning amendments, rests with district councils, a level
akin to our counties, at least somewhat removed from local politics.92
Municipalities, of course, have a strong claim to continuing to have
local affairs decided by local citizens. Removing all bias may mean that
decisions would be made without regard to local politics, but also with-
out regard to local priorities. Nevertheless, if further empirical evidence
suggests that bias is pervasive on zoning boards, the regional zoning
board alternative would undoubtedly bring more objective results.
V. Conclusion
Zoning board decisions affect countless citizens in profound ways
every day. The power to change a zone from residential to commercial
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or even industrial use can mean that your peaceful neighborhood may
become a nightmare. A variance granted can mean increased traffic,
more noise, light pollution, or obnoxious odors. Every decision a zon-
ing board makes affects the daily lives of the city’s people—what they
see or hear, where they have to drive, where they can walk, how they
live.
We should pay more attention to these boards, to ensure that each
citizen who comes before them has confidence that the slate is clean
and that his or her complaints or concerns will be heard and fairly
weighed. City officials should take care to make appointments that
reflect a broad cross-section of views and occupations, to ensure that
development interests do not dominate the boards and that the “average
citizen,” as Walker put it, has a fair chance of being heard.
Until boards become more balanced, courts should be aware that
boards are typically weighted toward white-collar interests and that
there is some development bias on most boards. In reviewing decisions
of these boards, the courts should ensure that their review takes into
account the local politics inherent in these cases.
Finally, states should require cities to enact a conflict of interest
provision that gives board members clear guidance as to the limits of
permissible interest. At least in larger cities, where conflicts are less
frequent, the provision should be broad in scope, to cover direct and
indirect bias situations. When in doubt, board members should recuse
themselves, to ensure that boards regain the public’s confidence that
the wheel is indeed balanced.
